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1. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS
1.1 (1987); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(a) (West 2008); William K.S. Wang & Marc I.
Steinberg, Practising Law Institute Insider Trading, PRACTISING L. INST. § 7:2.2, at *7-23 to
-24  (2006).
2. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, at 1.1; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b) (West
2008).
3. See Wang & Steinberg, supra note 1, § 7:2.2, at *7-23.
4. Id. § 7:2.2, at *7-24.
5. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 cmt. background (2001);
Wang & Steinberg, supra note 1, § 7:2.2, at *7-28-29..
6. The 2000 version of the Sentencing Guidelines that was used by the district court for
sentencing Mr. Nacchio is no longer effective.  See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062,
1066 (10th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009); see also id. at 1066 n.5 (explaining that
the 2000 Guideline §§ 2F1.1 (Fraud and Deceit) and 2F1.2 (Insider Trading) were deleted by
consolidation with § 2B1.1); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL pt. F; Elkan
Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Loss Calculation in Sentencing for Securities Fraud Cases,
242 N.Y. L.J. 3, n.10 (2009).  For the convenience of the reader, and consistency, all references
to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.2 throughout the remainder of this Note’s text will be referred to as § 2B1.4,
which is the current version of the Sentencing Guidelines specifically applicable to the offense
of insider trading.
7. See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1067 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2F1.2 (2000) (current version at
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 (2011)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009); see also U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4.     
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United States v. Nacchio:  The Tenth Circuit’s Civil
Approach to Sentencing for Insider Trading*
I. Introduction
In 1984, The Sentencing Reform Act created the United States Sentencing
Commission (Commission) to act as an independent agency in the judicial
branch.1  The Commission’s “principal purpose is to establish sentencing
policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system” that meet the
basic purposes of criminal punishment:  deterrence, incapacitation,
punishment, and rehabilitation.2  Pursuant to these goals, the Commission
developed guidelines to govern criminal sentencing in federal court.3  The
Sentencing Guidelines were meant to “provide a framework for courts to
impose consistent and proportional sentences for convicted defendants . . . .”4
Insider trading is treated “as a sophisticated fraud”5 and is specifically
covered by Section 2B1.46 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.7  If a
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8. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4(b)(1); see also Nacchio,
573 F.3d at 1067; United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1097-99 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
9. See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1086.
10. See id. at 1067-86.
11. See id. at 1086.
12. See Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062.
defendant is convicted of insider trading, the defendant’s sentence term may
be increased based on the amount of “gain” resulting from the offense.8  Thus,
the court’s gain calculation is critical to determination of an insider trading
defendant’s sentence.
In United States v. Nacchio, on an issue of first impression, the Tenth
Circuit announced a new standard for calculating the gain of a defendant
convicted of insider trading in violation of federal securities law.9  In Nacchio,
the court debated the adoption of two differing methods—net-profit versus
civil disgorgement—for calculating gain.10  After thoroughly considering each
method, the court specifically adopted civil disgorgement as the model for
calculating gain for criminal sentencing of insider trading defendants.11
Nacchio takes one side of a current split between the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits regarding the proper calculation of gain for insider trading offenses.
This Note examines the court’s opinion in Nacchio and considers how the
Tenth Circuit’s method of gain calculation will affect future sentencing for
inside traders.  Furthermore, this Note suggests that the Tenth Circuit’s
approach, based on civil jurisprudence, more accurately measures an inside
trading defendant’s gain and, therefore, is more consistent with the basic
policies of criminal punishment.
Part II gives a brief history of securities law, the origin of the offense of
insider trading, federal sentencing guidelines specific to insider trading, and
then explains the differing methods for calculating gain.  Part III describes the
facts and procedural history of United States v. Nacchio.  Part IV discusses the
Tenth Circuit’s decision to adopt a civil standard for sentencing defendants
convicted of insider trading.  Part V argues that the Tenth Circuit is correct in
determining that disgorgement is an appropriate guidepost for calculating gain
for defendants convicted of insider trading.  Disgorgement is more attuned to
the complexities of securities markets and seeks to punish a defendant only for
the amount of gain proximately related to the fraud.12  Part V then explores




13. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 19 (6th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter HAZEN, LAW].
14. See id. at 17.
15. See id. at 19-20.
16. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988).
17. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997).
18. See HAZEN, LAW, supra note 13, at 20; see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 179 (2d ed. 2006)  [hereinafter HAZEN, PRINCIPLES]
19. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
20. In re Cady, 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961).
21. HAZEN, LAW, supra note 13, at 20-21 (internal citations omitted).
22. See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 54 (2009).
23. 15 U.S.C.A. §78j(b) (West 2000); see also United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093,
II. Background Law
A. Brief History of Securities Law
Federal securities regulation in the United States grew out of the stock
market crash of 192913 and the subsequent congressional enactments of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.14  The
primary goal of the 1933 Act is to protect consumers by requiring greater
disclosure in the distribution of securities, thus giving investors the ability to
make a fair evaluation of investments.15
Following the Securities Act of 1933, Congress passed the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) in order to protect investors16 and
“insure honest securities markets . . . thereby promot[ing] investor
confidence.”17  The Exchange Act is a broad act governing all aspects of
publicly traded securities.18  The Exchange Act attempts to place all investors
on equal footing with regard to securities transactions.19  “A significant
purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that the use of inside
information for personal advantage was a normal [benefit of holding a]
corporate office.”20  As a result, the Exchange Act contains “provisions that
protect investors from fraud and material misstatements or omissions of
material facts in connection with any purchase or sale of securities.”21  The
Exchange Act delegates power to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to promulgate regulations designed to prohibit manipulation or
deception in the trading of securities and rules defining liability for willful
violations of the law.22  Specifically, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes
it unlawful for any person to use any manipulative or deceptive device when
purchasing or selling a security.23
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1106 n.10 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
24. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (elaborating on 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b)); see also
Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1106 n.10.
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
26. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1067 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (a)) (internal quotations
omitted).
27. HAZEN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 283 (citing In re Cady, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961));
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDES: SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.14 at 328
(2011) [hereinafter HAZEN, SECURITIES].
28. See In re Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 907.
29. See id. at 907-09.
30. See id. at 909.
31. See id.
The SEC elaborated somewhat on what constitutes an offense under Section
10(b) in Rule 10b-5.24 This rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to
employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; (b) to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c)
to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operations or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.25
Rule 10b-5 has been interpreted to prohibit among other things, “purchasing
or selling a security of any issuer, on the basis of material non-public
information . . . in breach of a duty of trust or confidence.”26
B. Defining the Offense of Insider Trading
“The seminal case of insider trading is In re Cady, Roberts & Co., decided
by the SEC in 1961.”27  The Chairman of the SEC considered a critical
question regarding the duties of a broker who receives material non-public
information relating to a publicly traded company.28  In Cady, a client of a
selling broker attended a company board meeting where the Board of Directors
made the decision to pay a lower dividend than previous quarters.29  During a
recess of the board meeting, the client called his broker and informed him of
the material non-public information regarding the lower dividend.30  Before the
reduced dividend had been announced to the public, the broker executed two
orders to sell the company’s stock based on the information provided by his
client.31  Later, when the lower dividend announcement was made public, the
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32. See id. at 909-10.
33. Id. at 911.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 912; see also Karen Testa, Note, Securities-Insider Trading-The Personal Gain
Test:  The Supreme Court Creates a Bridge Between Chiarella and Fraudulent ‘Outsider
Trading’ – Dirks v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983), 14 SETON
HALL L. REV. 715, 723 (1984).
37. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see also HAZEN, SECURITIES, supra note 27, § 12.14 at 328.
38. See Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 839-40.
39. See id. at 848 (emphasis added).
40. See id.
New York Stock Exchange was forced to suspend trading shares of the
company due to the large volume of sell orders.32  
In its review, the SEC held that before trading, “insiders must disclose
material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which
are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would
affect their investment judgment.”33  The SEC declared that a “[f]ailure to
make disclosure in these circumstances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud
provisions [of the Exchange Act].”34  Additionally, the SEC held that if
disclosure prior to trading is improper or unrealistic, the transaction must not
be made.35  The SEC went on to explain that:
[T]he obligation[s] [are based] on two principle elements:  1) a
relationship that gives access, directly or indirectly, to information
that is intended solely for a corporate purpose and not for
individual benefit; and 2) the inherent unfairness that arises when
a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to others with whom they are dealing.36
Later, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the Second Circuit further defined
an “insider” and explained an insider’s duties to the investing public.37  The
defendants were charged with violating Section 10b of the Securities and
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 by purchasing stock based on valuable inside
information regarding the company’s drilling activities.38  The Second Circuit
expanded the definition of “insider” from directors and officers of a company
to anyone in possession of material inside information.39  The court clearly
articulated that an insider has a duty to the investing public to either disclose
the material inside information; or if for some reason the insider cannot
disclose or chooses not to, then to abstain from trading or recommending the
securities pertaining to the inside information.40  
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41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing United
States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1105, 1106 n.9 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Bright, J., dissenting)),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009); see also SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 32 (1st Cir. 2004); 3
ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES
FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 6:128 (2d ed. 2009).
44. Wang & Steinberg, supra note 1, § 7:2.2, at *7-23. 
45. See id. 
46. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, at 1.2. 
47. See Wang & Steinberg, supra note 1, § 7:2.2, at *7-23-24.
48. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial prohibits the Sentencing Guidelines from being mandatory); see also Wang
& Steinberg, supra note 1, § 7:2.2, at *7-27, *7-37 to -38.
49. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing table
(2001).
50. See id. at § 2B1.4(a); see also United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1067 (10th Cir.
The court stated that in the absence of material non-public information, an
insider is free to invest in his own company.41  The duty to disclose or abstain
from trading only arises in situations where the insider obtains information that
is reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the
security if the inside information is disclosed.42  For an insider to commit the
offense of insider trading both knowledge and deceptive action are required.43
C. United States Sentencing Guidelines Specific to Insider Trading
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984 and created the United
States Sentencing Commission “to develop rules to govern sentencing in the
federal courts.”44  The Sentencing Reform Act mandated that the Sentencing
Commission define categories of offenses and create guideline ranges for
appropriate sentences.45  Congress’ primary objective for creating the
Commission was to reduce crime through an effective and fair sentencing
system.46  In an effort to promote individualized sentencing and prevent
disparate sentences, the Sentencing Commission created the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.).47  In a 2005 decision, United States v.
Booker, the United States Supreme Court declared that under the Sixth
Amendment, the U.S.S.G. could no longer be mandatory; however, the Court
stated that even “[w]ithout the ‘mandatory’ provision, the [Sentencing] Act
nonetheless require[d] judges to take account of the Guidelines together with
other sentencing goals.”48  Therefore, although advisory, U.S.S.G. continue to
play a crucial role in sentence determination.
Within a range of levels from one (0-6 months) to forty-three (life),49 a
conviction of insider trading carries with it a base level offense of eight (0-6
months).50  A defendant convicted of insider trading may additionally have his
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss3/5
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2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009); Wang & Steinberg, supra note 1, § 7:2.2, at *7-29-31.
51. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4(b) (2001); see also
Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1067; United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
52. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4(b)(1).  The Guidelines
refer to the specific offense characteristic of insider trading:  “If the gain resulting from the
offense exceeded $5,000, increase by the number of levels from the table in § 2B1.1 (Theft,
Property Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to that amount.”  Id.  
53. See Wang & Steinberg, supra  note 1, § 7:2.2, at 7-23 n.70 (listing cases that consider
nature of crime and prior record).
54. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, § 2B1.4(b)(1) (2001).
55. See Wang & Steinberg, supra note 1, § 7:2.2, at *7-24-5.
56. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4(b)(1).
57. See id. § 2B1.4 cmt. background.
58. David H. Angeli & Per A. Ramfjord, Reexamining ‘Loss’ and ‘Gain’ in the Wake of
Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo—New Ammunition for Securities Fraud Defendants,
CHAMPION, May 2006, at *14 (citing United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093 1105-06 (8th Cir.
2005) (en banc) (Bright, J. dissenting)).
59. See United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
West Coast Aluminum Heat Treating Co., 265 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2001) (proposing using
a “realistic, economic approach to determine what losses the defendant truly caused or intended
base sentence term increased relative to the amount of gain resulting from the
offense.51  Section 2B1.4(b) of the U.S.S.G., which describes the specific
offense characteristic of insider trading, advises that if the resulting gain of the
offense exceeds $5,000, then an insider trading defendant’s sentence term
should be increased in proportion to that gain.52  After calculating an offense
level based on the inside trader’s gain, and considering other factors such as
the defendant’s criminal history,53 a court can then use a sentencing table54 to
determine the appropriate sentencing term in months of imprisonment.55
Following U.S.S.G. Section 2B1.4, if a defendant is convicted of insider
trading, the calculation of gain is a significant factor in determining the years
of imprisonment an inside trader will face.56  When the Sentencing
Commission drafted Section 2B1.4, they envisioned that the sentence of an
inside trader would be increased in direct proportion to the increase in value
the insider realized through trading in securities based on material non-public
information—that is, the amount of gain.57  Therefore, it is important for a
sentencing court to consider that “[t]he gain resulting from the deception stops
when the deception stops, though there may be later gain (or loss) as the stock
market gyrates along, unmolested by any deception.”58  In order to ensure that
a defendant is sentenced in accordance with the harm that the defendant
actually caused by deceiving the market, it is crucial for a court to conduct an
economic analysis to determine the gain that the defendant received from
trading with insider knowledge.59
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to cause.”)); see also United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2009); Mooney, 425
F.3d 1105 (Bright, J., dissenting).  See generally Angeli & Ramfjord, supra note 58.
60. See Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1101.
61. See generally Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Mooney at 1106-07 (Bright, J., dissenting) (describing a hypothetical example of
net-profit calculation and resulting sentencing); see also Alexandra A.E. Shapiro & Nathan H.
Seltzer, Measuring ‘Gain’ Under the Insider Trading Sentencing Guideline Based on
Culpability for the Deception, 20 FED. SENT’G REP., 194, 198 (2008) (illustrating additional
hypothetical scenarios for calculating gain).
65. See id. at 1104-05 (Bye, J., concurring in part and joining in the dissent in part); see id.
D. Differing Approaches for Calculating Gain
Currently, there are two distinct methods used for calculating an inside
trader’s gain for sentencing, giving rise to a circuit split.  They are the net-
profit calculation and the civil disgorgement model.  Both have their strengths
and weaknesses.  Sentences based on calculations using one of these methods
are not likely to be consistent with sentences based on calculations using the
other.
1. Net-Profit Calculation of Gain
A net-profit approach to calculating an inside trader’s gain, like the method
adopted by the Eighth Circuit,60 is simple and efficient.  In order to calculate
the gain from the illegal transaction, the court determines the price of the stock
at the point when the defendant purchased the stock with inside information
and the number of shares purchased at that time.61  Next, the court determines
the price of the stock at the point in time when the defendant sold the stock
previously purchased based on the inside information, and the number of
shares sold.62  Then, the court subtracts the value of the shares purchased with
inside information from the value of the shares when they were subsequently
sold to determine the net-profit amount of gain.63
For example, suppose on day 1 a stock has an inherent value of $100 per
share.  On day 2, an insider learns of material non-public information and
purchases 2,000 shares at $100 each, for $200,000.  On day 4, the material
information is disclosed to the public and the stock price rises to $125 per
share.  The insider sells all 2,000 shares for $250,000.  A court using the net-
profit method would calculate the gain to be $50,000.64
A net-profit calculation does not consider external factors related to the
stock price (such as inherent stock value or extrinsic market factors) that may
also impact the price of the stock.  Therefore, the net-profit method has the
potential to punish inside traders for factors unrelated to their deception.65  In
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss3/5
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at 1105 (Bright, J. dissenting). 
66. See CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO INSIDER TRADING AND REPORTING § 4:9
(Thompson Reuters Supp. 2009) (explaining the Mooney majority’s net-profit approach to
calculating an insider trading defendant’s gain).  See generally  Mooney, 425 F.3d 1105; see
also Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1077.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 54 (2009).
68. See generally Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062.
69. See Mooney at 1106-07 (Bright, J., dissenting) (describing a hypothetical example of
net-profit calculation and resulting sentencing); see also Shapiro & Seltzer, supra note 64, at
198 (illustrating additional hypothetical scenarios for calculating gain).
70. See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077-80; see also Shapiro & Seltzer, supra note 64, at 198.
the example above, if on day 3 the stock climbed $3 per share based solely on
market factors unrelated to the non-public information the insider used in his
purchase, the court would still calculate the gain from the insider’s deception
as $50,000.  Nevertheless, a net-profit calculation does “provide[] a clear and
coherent bright-line rule, eliminating the need for extensive factfinding . . . .”66
2. Civil Disgorgement Calculation of Gain
A disgorgement approach to calculating gain involves extensive fact-finding
in order to identify the point when (if at all) the security market learned of the
inside information and absorbed this non-public information into the value of
the stock.67  This method seeks to exclude market factors that affect the value
of the security and are unrelated to the defendant’s deception.68  A
disgorgement calculation of gain is much more complex than simply
subtracting the purchase value from the sales value of the ill-gotten securities.
For example, suppose on day 1 a stock has an inherent value of $100 per share.
On day 2, an insider learns of material non-public information and purchases
2,000 shares at $100, for $200,000.  On day 3, the stock price climbs $3 per
share based solely on market factors unrelated to the non-public information
the defendant used in his purchase.  Thus, the stock would have a value of
$103 completely unrelated to the defendant’s deception on the market.  On day
4, the material information is disclosed to the public and the stock price rises
to $125 per share. On day 5, the stock price subsequently falls, for unrelated
market reasons, to $110 per share, and the inside trader then sells the 2,000
shares for $220,000.69
Using a disgorgement theory for calculating a defendant’s gain, a court
would begin by conducting an economic study to determine what effect the
disclosure of the material non-public information had on the value of the
stock.70  The study would attempt to ascertain the value of the stock when the
non-public information was disclosed and absorbed by the market, which is
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71. See Shapiro & Seltzer, supra note 64, at 194, 198.
72. See id.  See generally Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062.
73. See Shapiro & Seltzer, supra note 64, at 194 (illustrating additional hypothetical
scenarios for calculating gain).
74. See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077.
75. Id. at 1069; see Shapiro & Seltzer, supra note 64, at 194-95.
76. See United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).  Mr.
Mooney was Vice President of Underwriting for United Healthcare Corp. (United).  See id. at
1095.  Mr. Mooney traded in United’s stock based on confidential due diligence meetings he
had attended pertaining to a potential acquisition of a privately owned healthcare company
(Metra).  See id. at 1095-98.  
77. See id. at 1098.
78. See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1070 (citing Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1100).
not necessarily the same point as when the defendant sold the stock.71  Next,
the court would exclude the inherent value of the stock and other market
factors that effected the price of the stock and were unrelated to the insider’s
deception, regardless of whether or not such factors were to the insider’s
benefit.72
A disgorgement calculation of gain using the above example might look
something like this:  stock price when material non-public information was
revealed and absorbed by the market price ($125); minus the inherent value of
stock ($100); minus unrelated market factors increasing the value of the stock
($3); equals $22 gain per share from insider knowledge.  Exclude unrelated
market factors decreasing the value of the stock and multiply by the number
of shares (2,000) for a total of $44,000 gain to the defendant.73  Clearly, this
system is more complex than net-profit, and even has the potential to yield
gain calculations that are higher than the actual profit at the time of sale.  Yet
considering the complexities of securities markets and the sophistication of the
fraud of insider trading, the disgorgement approach is a more appropriate
measure of the gain proximately related to the inside trader’s deception.74
D. Mooney:  The Eight Circuit’s Gain Calculation
Prior to Nacchio, the Eighth Circuit was “the only other circuit decision
squarely deciding the issue of gain under the insider trading sentencing
guideline.”75  In United States v. Mooney, the defendant was convicted of
securities fraud for trading in his company’s stock based on inside information
regarding a potential acquisition.76  Mr. Mooney appealed the district court’s
calculation of gain, arguing that the court had overestimated the amount he had
profited from insider trading, and thus had incorrectly determined his
sentence.77  The divided en banc Eighth Circuit rejected the market absorption
approach proposed by Mr. Mooney, and instead adopted the net-profit
calculation used by the district court to determine gain.78  The court interpreted
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79. See Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1099-1100.
80. See id. at 1099-1101 (dismissing civil disgorgement approach).
81. See id. at 1099-1100.
82. See id. at 1101.
83. See id. at 1099.
84. See id. at 1098-1101.
85. Id. at 1101.
86. See id. at 1105 (Bright, J., dissenting).
87. See id. (emphasis added).
88. See id. at 1106 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5); accord U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4  cmt. (2001) (referencing statutory
provisions). 
89. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1106.
the language of Section 2B1.4 of the U.S.S.G. to require a calculation of the
defendant’s actual gain, instead of excluding any gain attributable to external
market forces.79  The court declined to consider the changes in market value
of the stock which may have resulted from factors extrinsic to the material
non-public information.80  Instead, the court held that gain was properly
calculated by measuring the increase in the stock price from the time when the
defendant purchased the options to when the defendant sold the options, less
transaction fees.81  The court concluded that adopting a market absorption
theory, as proposed by Mr. Mooney, would require extensive fact-finding by
the sentencing court.82  Additionally, the court stated that difficulty would arise
in ascertaining the point where the market absorbed and adjusted to the
revelation of the material non-public information used by the insider.83
The Mooney majority further reasoned that a sentencing theory based on
civil jurisprudence, and based on compensating victims, would not comport
with the goals of punishment and deterrence in criminal sentencing.84  The
divided court held that the net “increase in value realized by the defendant’s
trades provides a simple, accurate, and predictable rule for judges to apply [in
criminal sentencing] and follows the congressional mandate that sentences
reflect the seriousness of the offense.”85
Judge Bright was joined by Judge Lay in a powerful dissent to the court’s
interpretation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and calculation of gain.86
Judge Bright focused on the specific language “gain resulting from the
offense” found in the U.S.S.G., and looked to relevant statues and regulations
to help define the “offense” involved in insider trading.87  Analyzing the
Guidelines and statutes,88 Judge Bright interpreted “‘[t]he offense’ . . . not [as]
the purchase of stock itself, but the use of a manipulative or deceptive
contrivance in connection with the purchase.”89  Thus, according to the
dissent’s interpretation of the statutes and regulations relating to insider
trading, the offense is not the purchase itself, but the deception entwined with
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90. See id.
91. See id.




96. See id. Using the net-profit approach to calculate gain for the hypothetical corporate
officers in Judge Bright’s illustration, Officer A would receive a two (2) level increase for his
$10,000 gain, Officer B would receive a six (6) level increase for his $45,000 gain, and Officer
C would not receive any increase at all because under a net-profit theory, Officer C lost money
on the ill-gotten stocks.  See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 1106-07.
99. See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1065 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
the purchase.90  Expanding on this interpretation, the dissent reasoned that the
“gain resulting from the offense . . . [was] not the gain resulting from the
purchase . . . [but instead] the gain resulting from the deception.”91
Judge Bright proposed a hypothetical to illustrate how a net-profit approach
would lead to disparate sentencing for defendants whose real conduct was the
same.92  In Judge Bright’s hypothetical, three corporate officers each with the
same insider knowledge purchased stock at the same time and price.93  Later
in the hypothetical, after “the insider knowledge is made public,  and . . .
absorbed by the market and the stock price reflects that knowledge,” each of
the three officers sold the stock at different times.94  Officer A sold the stock
for a $10,000 gain, Officer B sold stock for a $45,000 gain, and Officer C sold
the stock for a loss.95  Judge Bright explained that although each of the three
hypothetical corporate officers purchased the stock with material inside
information at the same time, because the officers sold the stock at different
times and for different market prices, each corporate officer could have
staggeringly different sentences if the net-profit theory was used.96  In contrast,
if a market absorption approach was utilized to determine the stock price after
the inside knowledge is made public and absorbed by the market, each of the
hypothetical defendants would receive the same standard in sentencing.97
Thus, Judge Bright stated that a market absorption theory would align with the
Sentencing Guidelines policy of promoting uniformity in sentencing and equal
sentencing for equal crimes.98
III. United States v. Nacchio
A. Factual Background
In 1997, Joseph Nacchio became Qwest Communication International,
Inc.’s (Qwest) Chief Executive Officer.99  “Like many corporate executives,
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S. Ct. 54 (2009).  Mr. Nacchio was also a member of the Board of Directors.  See id.
100. United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2008); see United States v.
Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1065 (10th Cir. 2009).  Stock options are a common part of CEO
salaries as they provide both incentives for the executives to perform and cash-flow advantages
to the company.  See Nacchio, 519 F.3d at 1147.
101. See Nacchio, 519 F.3d at 1144-45.




106. See id. One reason for the “risk” and the potential shortfall in revenue was that “Qwest
had traditionally relied on revenues from long-term leases, known as indefeasible rights of use
(IRUs), to use space on Qwest's fiber optic network.”  See id.  “Because Qwest collected money
for the entire lease up front, IRU sales generated one-time revenue [and not] recurring income.”
Id.  Therefore, in order to meet Mr. Nacchio’s aggressive revenue target, Qwest would have had
to “make an ‘aggressive pivot’ or ‘shift’ from its reliance on the sale of IRUs to recurring
revenue streams.”  Id.  The numbers were troublesome as “Qwest [already] had a poor track
record in growing recurring revenue, [and] the 2001 budget would require Qwest to double its
2000 growth rate for recurring revenue” to make the 2001 public revenue target.  Id.
107. See id. at 1147.
108. See id.
Mr. Nacchio received a substantial portion of his compensation in stock
options rather than in cash.”100  In September 2000, after Qwest merged with
another larger telecommunications company, Mr. Nacchio established new
revenue, earnings, and growth targets for 2001.101  Mr. Nacchio announced to
the public a prediction of $21.3 to $21.7 billion for Qwest’s 2001 year end
expected revenue.102
Immediately following Mr. Nacchio’s announcement of the new revenue
targets, “some Qwest employees expressed concern that the public guidance
and revenue targets were too high.”103  Qwest’s Vice President of Financial
Planning, Robin Szeliga, was presented with an internal “risk estimate” memo
by two financial analysts which forecasted significant problems with the public
predictions.104  The memo suggested that Qwest could fall short of its public
target by $900 million.105 Ms. Szeliga disclosed the contents of the risk
estimate memo to Mr. Nacchio and Qwest’s Chief Financial Officer, Robert
Woodruff.106
In October 2000, Mr. Nacchio held options worth $7.4 million in Qwest
stock with an expiration date of June 2003.107  Qwest had a company policy
that only allowed officers to sell stock according to either a fixed plan or
during short “trading windows” immediately following Qwest’s quarterly
earnings announcements.108  “Mr. Nacchio announced that he would exercise
[his] options and sell approximately one million shares each quarter” in order
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109. Id.
110. See id.  Mr. Nacchio did briefly enter into a formal trading plan in February 2001.  Id.
111. See id. at 1145.
112. See id.  If Qwest failed to sign up enough new recurring revenue customers in the first
quarter of 2001, it would not later have the benefit of compounding the revenue to close its third
and fourth quarter budge gaps and Qwest would be forced to revise its public guidance
downward.  See id.
113. See id.  It was Qwest’s policy not to disclose the portion of its income attributable to
the one-time IRU revenue sales.  See id.  In February 2001, Mr. Nacchio briefly entered into the
fixed plan to sell options, but he cancelled the plan less than one month later, when Qwest’s
stock fell below $38 per share.  See id. at 1147.
114. See id. at 1145-46.  A Qwest Executive Vice-President, Greg Casey, told Mr. Nacchio
that the IRU market was drying up and the company could not rely on IRUs as a source of
revenue after the second quarter.  See id. at 1146.  
115. See id.  On April 9, Ms. Szeliga informed Mr. Nacchio that the 2001 revenue plan was
very risky if Qwest was going to rely solely on IRUs to cover the estimated gaps in the revenue
projections.  See id.
116. Id.  Nonetheless, at the same time, “Mr. Nacchio was told at a company meeting that
even ‘with all of the debates . . . the internal current view of Qwest was that they would reach
$21.5 billion by December 31st 2001,’ still meeting the public projections.”  Id.
117. Id.
to realize the entire $7.4 million value before their expiration date.109
Although this plan was approved by Qwest’s General Counsel, Mr. Nacchio
did not enter into the formal trading plan at that time.110
In December 2000, Qwest executives informed Mr. Nacchio that a
significant shift from sales of one-time revenue generating leases, known as
indefeasible rights of use (IRUs),111 to monthly recurring revenue sales had to
occur by April 2001 for the company to achieve the 2001 year-end public
revenue target.112  At this time, Mr. Nacchio and other Qwest insiders were
aware of the possibility that the company may not meet the 2001 year-end
public revenue target; however, the public was unaware of the risk because
Qwest did not disclose the composition of its revenue attributable to each of
these two sources.113
In early April 2001, Mr. Nacchio was informed that “the market for IRU
sales was drying up”114 and “Qwest could not rely on IRU sales to cover the
estimated gaps in the 2001 year end revenue projections.”115  Mr. Nacchio was
told that “recurring revenue [sales targets] [were] off by 19%, indicating that
the company was well short of increasing its monthly recurring revenue sales
in time to reduce its third and fourth quarter budget gaps.”116
In spite of the revenue shortfall indications, “on April 24, 2001, Qwest
announced its first quarter earnings in a press release.”117  Mr. Nacchio also
conducted a conference call with investors during which he announced the
company was “still confirming” the previously issued public revenue
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118. See id.  Mr. Nacchio did not break down Qwest’s earnings into one-time IRUs and
recurring revenue despite the fact that analysts and investors repeatedly requested a breakdown
of Qwest’s revenue during the first quarter of 2001.  See id.
119. See id.  Later the same day, Mr. Nacchio met with investors in Los Angeles.  See id.
Those investors pointed out that other telecom companies had lowered their guidance, and one
of the investors asked Mr. Nacchio how Qwest was going to meet its growth targets.  See id.
Mr. Nacchio responded to the investor by declaring that Qwest had better products and better
management and stressing Qwest’s strong revenue growth in the category of “data and IP.”  See
id.  One-time revenue transactions made up a portion of this revenue but Mr. Nacchio did not
mention this to investors.  See id.
120. See id. at 1147. 
121. Id. at 1146.
122. See id. at 1147.  During this time, the stock price fluctuated between $37-$42 per share.
See id.
123. See id.  However, Mr. Nacchio sold only “slightly more than the one million shares per
quarter he had declared his intention to sell in his October 2000 announcement.”  Id.
124. See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1066 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 54 (2009).  In early August 2001, “Mr. Nacchio gave a presentation in which he showed
a slide reporting Qwest’s annual actual and estimated IRU sales as a percentage of revenue from
1996 to 2001.” Id.  This presentation was filed publicly with the SEC.  See id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Nacchio, 519 F.3d at 1146.
guidance.118  Mark Schumacher, Qwest’s controller, advocated for Mr.
Nacchio to disclose to investors the company’s one-time IRU and recurring
revenue numbers; however, Mr. Nacchio declined to do so.119  Two days after
Mr. Nacchio’s conference call with investors, Qwest’s second quarter trading
window opened.120  While Mr. Nacchio was receiving “internal reports
regarding IRU sales and recurring revenue and assuring investors that the
company was on track to meet its public guidance, he was selling over a
million shares of Qwest stock.”121  Between April 26, 2001 and May 15, 2001,
Mr. Nacchio sold 1,255,000 shares of Qwest stock.122  In this brief window,
Mr. Nacchio’s rate of stock sales rose to approximately four times his average
rate of sales from 1998 to 2000.123
In a late July 2001 press release, Qwest reported the company’s second
quarter financial results, and announced to investors that Qwest’s expected
revenue for 2001 would be near the low end of previously predicted ranges.124
On August 14, 2001, Qwest “disclosed the magnitude of its 2000 and 2001
[one-time] IRU sales in a filing with the SEC.”125  Finally, “[o]n September 10,
2001, Mr. Nacchio issued a press release lowering Qwest’s public revenue
targets for 2001 and 2002.”126  Subsequently, Qwest’s stock fell to half its
value.127
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128. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1064.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1066.  “[Mr. Nacchio] was acquitted of twenty-three counts covering earlier
trades.”  Id.
132.  See id. at 1068-69 (rejecting both the government’s proposed net-profit approach and
Mr. Nacchio’s proposed market absorption theory and instead calculating gain by taking Mr.
Nacchio’s total net-profit from the sale and subtracting the cost to purchase the options, and the
amount withheld for taxes—since taxes withheld were not actually converted to cash by
Nacchio).
133. Id. at 1066.  Additionally, “[t]he district court . . . assessed a $19 million fine and
ordered [Mr. Nacchio] to forfeit approximately $52 million.”  Id.
134. See id.  In addition to appealing the ‘gain’ calculation, Mr. Nacchio successfully
appealed the amount he was ordered to forfeit by the district court.  See id. at 1090.
135. Id. at 1066 (referencing Section 2F1.2, the 2000 version of the Sentencing Guidelines,
which is the version that the district court used when sentencing Mr. Nacchio); see supra note
6 and accompanying text.
136. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062.
“In December 2003, Mr. Nacchio was indicted and charged with forty-two
counts of insider trading.”128  The government claimed Mr. Nacchio knew it
was unlikely that Qwest could meet the 2001 year-end revenue targets the
company had publically announced to investors.129  The government alleged
Mr. Nacchio violated securities laws by selling Qwest stock “on the basis of
material, nonpublic information.”130
B. Procedural History at the District Court
At the district court, Mr. Nacchio “was convicted on nineteen counts of
insider trading covering the trades that he had made from April 26, 2001 to
May 29, 2001.”131  The district court calculated Mr. Nacchio’s gain from the
trades132 and sentenced him to “seventy-two months’ imprisonment on each
count, to run concurrently, and two years of supervised release on each count,
also to run concurrently.”133  On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Mr. Nacchio
challenged the determination of his sentence term134 claiming “the district
court incorrectly calculated the ‘gain resulting from the offense’ under
[U.S.S.G. Section 2B1.4].”135
IV. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision
A. An Issue of First Impression — Gain Resulting from Insider Trading
In United States v. Nacchio, the Tenth Circuit addressed as an issue of first
impression the proper method for calculating an inside trader’s gain for the
purpose of criminal sentencing.136  The Court relied on the U.S.S.G.,
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137. See id. at 1069-71.
138. See id. at 1072.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 1073 (interpreting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(l) and § 1B1.3(a)(1)).
141. See id. at 1079-80.
142. United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (calculating Mr. Olis’s sentence
under Section 2B1.1 and adding 26 levels to the base offense finding that Mr. Olis caused a loss
of $105 million to one investor); see also Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 6 (citing Olis, 429
F.3d 540).
143. See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1075 (citing Olis, 429 F.3d 545-49) (supporting the theory
that stock price movements based upon factors unrelated to the defendant’s offense should be
excluded from a Guidelines loss determination).
144. See id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 cmt.
background (2001) (defining ‘gain’ as “the total increase in value realized through trading in
securities by the defendant” (emphasis added)).
145. See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1074.
146. Id. at 1072 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 1075.
commentary to the Guidelines, the Mooney majority and dissent, relevant case
law, and United States policy for federal sentencing to direct their
determination of the proper standard.137
The court began its discussion by examining the offense of insider trading
and the language of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines statute.138  The court
analyzed the language of Section 2B1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines,139 along
with the application instructions in the Guideline commentary, and concluded
that both the U.S.S.G. and the commentary limited the gain computation to
that gain resulting from the deceptive nature of the action140 and, therefore,
should exclude factors unrelated to the defendant’s conduct.141
Citing United States v. Olis,142 a Fifth Circuit decision regarding criminal
securities fraud,143 the Tenth Circuit stated that the language of the Guidelines
itself recognizes that there is an inherent value in stock which should not be
reflected in a gain computation.144  The court stressed the importance of
excluding unrelated market factors from the gain computation,145 and held that
“it [is] incumbent upon [a] district court to adopt a realistic, economic
approach [to sentencing] that . . . [takes] into account . . . the deception
intertwined with . . . [a defendant's] insider knowledge, and . . . compute his
gain for sentencing purposes . . . resulting from that deception.”146  The court
concluded that “Mr. Nacchio’s increased prison sentence should be linked to
the gain actually resulting from the offense, not to gain attributable to
legitimate price appreciation and the underlying inherent value of Qwest
shares.”147
The Tenth Circuit found the district court’s net-profit calculation of Mr.
Nacchio’s gain inadequate because it “ignored [many] factors unrelated to [Mr.
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148. Id. at 1074 (citing HAZEN, LAW, supra note 13, at 195).
149. See id. at 1077.
150. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 cmt. n.9 (“[T]he loss need not be determined with
precision.  The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available
information.”) (citations omitted)); see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
151. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077 (citing United States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d 894,
904 (10th Cir. 2008)).
152. See id. (citing United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cir. 2005)) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
153. See id. at 1078.
154. Id. (quoting Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005)). 
155. Id. at 1079.
156. Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 6, at 3; see also Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077-78
(quoting SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004)).
157. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077-78 (citing SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004))
(quoting SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc)); see also Abramowitz
& Bohrer, supra note 6, at 4 (citing Happ, 392 F.3d at 31) (quoting MacDonald, 699 F.2d at
55)).
Nacchio’s] criminal fraud that could have contributed to the increase in the
value of [Qwest’s stock].”148  Acknowledging that a net-profit approach would
provide a more simplistic calculation for gain,149 the court explained that the
Guidelines themselves recognized that “sentencing computations in financial
fraud cases may involve some element of imprecision.”150  The court stated
that “a critical objective of federal sentencing is imposing criminal punishment
on a defendant that reflects his or her culpability for the criminal offense.”151
Therefore, despite greater complexity and imprecision, district courts must
conduct a thorough analysis grounded in economic reality when imposing
criminal sentences in insider trading cases.152
Next, the Nacchio court turned to civil jurisprudence for guidance to
properly determine gain from insider trading offenses.153  Stating that
“[c]riminal cases have the same ‘tangle of factors effecting price’ that is found
in civil cases,”154 the court determined that civil disgorgement should be the
guidepost for insider trading gain calculations because “it seeks to strip the
wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains and deter improper conduct.”155  Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, and the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion in Olis, the court found the district court was “required to consider the
myriad of factors unrelated to criminal fraud that could have contributed to the
value of the securities.”156
The civil disgorgement remedy is generally “the difference between the
value of the shares when the insider sold them while in possession of material,
non-public information, and their market value a reasonable time after public
dissemination of the inside information.”157  The court explained that a
disgorgement approach is consistent with central principles of federal
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158. See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1080.
159. See id. at 1082.
160. Id. at 1085-86.
161. Id. at 1085.
162. Id. at 1072.
163. See id. at 1087, 1090-91.  Following remand, the district court ordered the parties to file
sentencing statements. See United States v. Nacchio, No. 05-cr-00545-MSK, 2009 WL
5126376, at *4-*5 (D. Colo. Dec. 18, 2009).  The sentencing statements are available on
Westlaw. See Sentencing Statement by the United States Regarding 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), United
States v. Nacchio, No. 05-cr-00545-MSK, 2010 WL 3336351 (D. Colo. June 10, 2010); Joseph
P. Nacchio’s Section 3553(a) Sentencing Statement, United States v. Nacchio, No. 05-cr-00545-
MSK, 2010 WL 3336350 (D. Colo. June 10, 2010).
164. SEC v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 425 (D. Md. 2005).
sentencing policy—individualized punishment and deterrence—because it
endeavors “to hold the defendant accountable [only] for the portion of the
increased value of the stock that is related to his or her criminally culpable
conduct.”158  The court then used the hypothetical from the Mooney dissent to
illustrate how the district court’s net-profit calculation would run contrary to
the purposes of federal sentencing, individualized sentencing and avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities, by resulting in sentences detached from the
defendant’s criminally culpable conduct.159  Finally, the court reasoned that,
“even viewed solely from a policy perspective, [disgorgement] would be a
more appropriate means [than net-profit] to determine a defendant’s gain
resulting from [insider trading]”160 because it is focused on defendant
culpability and is “consonant with the purposes of federal sentencing.”161
The court rejected the district court’s net-profit approach to calculating an
inside trader’s gain, concluding that it “[did] not square with the plain
language of the relevant sentencing guideline . . . and its commentary.”162  The
Tenth Circuit then reversed the district court’s sentencing order and held that
Mr. Nacchio was entitled to resentencing using disgorgement as the guidepost
for calculating the gain resulting from his insider trading.163
V. Analysis
A. The Tenth Circuit Remains True to the U.S.S.G.
The Tenth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Nacchio, is consistent with
the plain language of U.S.S.G. 2B1.4, the commentary to the statute, and
United States Federal Sentencing policies.  The court properly concluded that
disgorgement is a fair standard to use as a benchmark for a court calculating
gain for inside traders because “the purpose of disgorgement is to force the
defendant into giving up unjust enrichment he received as a result of his illegal
activities [in violation of the securities laws].”164  The Nacchio court’s
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165. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2003).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 3553(a)(2).
168. See HAZEN, SECURITIES, supra note 27, § 1.1 at 2-6, § 12.14 at 326-27.  See generally
WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 2.3.1, at 24-26 (2010).
169. See Rule 16(b) (codified as 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b) (West 2002)).
170. See Rule 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(codified as 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010)).
adoption of a civil disgorgement model for calculating gain effectively
incorporates federal sentencing policy by considering an individual
defendant’s criminal culpability in order to hold the defendant responsible for
the gain realized by trading securities with material inside information, while
excluding extrinsic market factors and inherent stock value.
B. Determining Gain Using Disgorgement Accurately Reflects the Purposes
of Imposing a Criminal Sentence
Title 18 United States Code Section 3553 lists several factors to be
considered when imposing a criminal sentence.165  The statute states that a
sentencing court “shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes”166 of “reflect[ing] the seriousness of
the offense, . . . provid[ing]  just punishment for the offense, . . . [and]
afford[ing] adequate deterrence to criminal conduct . . . .”167
1. Criminal Sentencing Should Reflect the Seriousness of the Offense
A basic and fundamental principle underlying the United States economy
is the integrity of the securities markets.168  When an individual purchases or
sells securities while in possession of material non-public information this
integrity is breached and the stability of the financial markets and the economy
are jeopardized.  Congress and the SEC realized the threat and the seriousness
of an insider’s possession and misuse of material non-public information and
created statutes and rules specifically aimed at preventing169 and punishing170
this type of behavior.  In order to evaluate the effectiveness of criminal
sentencing, a broad view of securities laws must be considered.  Thus, the
criminal sanctions for insider trading need to be evaluated in the context of
related civil provisions.
a) Rule 16(b) Civil Short-Swing Profit Liability Aimed at Prevention
To emphasize the serious nature of the offense of trading with inside
information, and in an effort to deter the misuse of such information, the SEC
created a rule which imposes strict civil liability for corporate officers,
directors, and principle stockholders who own at least ten percent of a
company’s stock and purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, stock within a
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171. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b); see also HAZEN, SECURITIES, supra note 27, § 13.2 at 360-
64.
172. See id. (referring to a purchase or sale of a security within a six month period); see also
R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Securities Exchange Act Provision Regarding Liability of Directors,
Officers and Principle Stockholders for Profits on Short-Swing Speculation in Corporation’s
Stock, 40 A.L.R. 2d 1346, 1348-49 (1955);  see also HAZEN, SECURITIES, supra note 27, § 13.2
at 360-64.
173. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b);  see also HAZEN, SECURITIES, supra note 27, § 13.2 at 360-
64.
174.  See HAZEN, SECURITIES, supra note 27, § 13.2 at 363.
175. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
176. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997).
177. Id. at 665 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)).
178. Id. at 666 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)).
179. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b).
180. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2010).
six month period.171  Rule 16(b) of the Securities Act declares that any profit
realized from a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, by a statutory insider
within a six month period is strictly recoverable to the corporation irrespective
of any intention of the insider entering into the transaction.172  Rule 16(b) may
be enforced without any allegation of trading based on material inside
information.173  Instead, a purchase and sale within six months of each other
by a statutory insider is sufficient to trigger disgorgement to the company of
any profit received.  This strict civil liability, without any required allegation
of the insider’s use of non-public information, emphasizes the importance
given to insider trading offenses by Congress and the SEC.174
b) Rule 10b Criminal Liability Aimed at Punishment
In an effort to punish and deter anyone from trading securities with material
non-public information, the SEC passed Rule 10b-5, which makes it a criminal
offense for any person, directly or indirectly, to purchase or sell a security on
the basis of fraud or deceit.175  Because Congress did not intend criminal
punishment to be strictly imposed, however, there are two safeguards for
imposing criminal liability for a violation of Rule 10b-5:176 First, “the
Government must prove that a person ‘willfully’ violated the provision,”177 and
second, “a defendant may not be imprisoned for violating Rule 10b-5 if [the
defendant] proves that he had no knowledge of the Rule.”178
Section 10(b) makes the use of any “deceptive device” in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security unlawful,179 and Rule 10b-5 makes it
unlawful to “engage in any act . . . which would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”180
The plain language of the relevant statues indicate that deception combined
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Ct. 54 (2009).
183. See id. at 1080; see also S.E.C. v. Unioil 951 F.2d 1304, 1306 (1991); S.E.C. v.
Maxxon Inc., 465 F.3d 1174, 1179 (C.A.10 Okla. 2006) (discussing disgorgement and stating
that “some end-date determination is necessary in determining remedy in securities fraud action
so that the defendant is not required to disgorge profits not causally connected to violation”)
(emphasis added) (citing ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURES & REMEDIES UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS § 20:109) (internal citations omitted); S.E.C. v. Haligiannis, 470 F. Supp.2d
373 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“amount of disgorgement . . . only a reasonable approximation of profits
causally connected to the violation . . . .” id. at 384); S.E.C. v. Opulentica, LLC, 479 F. Supp.2d
319, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Principal issue in determining amount of disgorgement to be
ordered in action under federal securities law is amount of gain received by each defendant from
fraud.”) (internal citations omitted).
184. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (holding that a defendant may be
criminally liable under a misappropriation theory for deceptive conduct in connection with
securities transactions under § 10(b)); see also Shapiro & Seltzer, supra note 64, at 198. 
185. See generally United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
186. See generally id.
with trading is key a component to a criminal violation of the securities
laws.181  Thus, the Nacchio court clearly and accurately defined the offense as
“deception intertwined with the [sale of securities] due to . . . possession of
insider knowledge.”182  The civil disgorgement benchmark is appropriately
tailored to punish only on the basis of the criminal act, and not on the basis of
enrichment not proximately caused by criminal deception.183  
Tailoring punishment only to deceptive action finds support in United States
v. O’Hagan, in which the Supreme Court stated that “[Section] 10(b)’s
language . . . requires deception ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.’”184  A net-profit approach for calculating an inside trader’s gain for
sentencing would not take into account the deception intertwined with trading.
Unlike disgorgement, a net-profit calculation does not take into account the
value of the security up to the point when, and for a reasonable time after, the
material non-public information is disclosed to investors.185  Net-profit is a
simple measure of the difference in the price of a security at Point A
(purchase) and Point B (subsequent sale).186  When employing a net-profit
calculation of gain, the impact that the material non-public information may
have on the value of the security is not even a factor, and thus the net-profit
approach does not consider the impact of the insider’s deception on public
investor’s confidence.  The Tenth Circuit’s disgorgement benchmark for
calculating gain for criminal inside trading sentencing better adheres to the
congressional goal of crafting a sentence that reflects the seriousness a
defendant’s deception combined with trading in securities.
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191. Id.
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held responsible for the crime itself, regardless of any realized increase in value.





2. A Criminal Sentence Should Provide Just Punishment for the Offense
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
protection for defendants by preventing punishment that is grossly
disproportionate to an offense.187  Congress has stated that a criminal sentence
shall be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”188  Section 2B1.4 of the
U.S.S.G., which defines punishment for the offense of insider trading, provides
courts some guidance for determining Congress’ intended measure of just
punishment for inside traders.189  The Background to Section 2B1.4 clearly
states that a defendant’s gain should be used to determine the offense level for
sentencing.190  In order for insider trading punishment to be “just,” it should
correlate to the actual harm that the defendant proximately caused by the
deceptive trading.  The Background to Section 2B1.4 defines gain as the “total
increase in value,”191 thus recognizing that securities have some inherent value,
and therefore “a defendant should be held responsible only for any increase
in value that he realizes as a result of his deception.”192  By conducting a
thorough economic analysis to determine a defendant’s profit received from
deceptive trading, and excluding factors unrelated to the defendant’s culpable
conduct, the Tenth Circuit’s disgorgement benchmark to calculate gain for an
inside trader’s term of imprisonment is consistent with the congressional goal
of imposing a sentence that is not greater than necessary to provide “just”
punishment for the offense.
In contrast, a net-profit approach may impose a sentence that is grossly
disproportionate to the harm that was proximately caused by the defendant’s
deceptive trading.  For instance, consider a scenario where an insider
purchases stock based on material non-public information.193  At the time of
purchase the stock is trading at $5 per share.194  A short time after the
purchase, the material information is disclosed to the public and the stock price
rises to $8 per share.195  Nevertheless, the insider refrains from selling the
stock; instead, the insider holds the stock for many years and the stock
legitimately increases in value to $20 per share.196  Now, suppose the insider
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198. See id. (illustrating a hypothetical scenario calculating gain using net-profit and
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199. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1, 2B1.4, 5A (2001)
(providing rules and charts for calculating the length of sentences).
200. See id.
sells the stock for $20 per share.197  Using the net-profit approach for
calculating the insider’s gain, the insider’s sentence would be based on $15
worth of gain instead of the actual $3 worth of gain that proximately resulted
from the insider’s criminal conduct.198
If the insider, in the above hypothetical, had traded 350 shares, he should
receive no increase above the base 0-6 month sentence when the gain is
calculated at $3 per share, for a total gain of $1,050.199  But, if the gain is
calculated at $15 per share, for a total gain of $5,250, the insider should
receive an increased sentence of 6-12 months.200  A double-length sentence for
the same crime seems at least somewhat disproportionate, and potentially
raises Eighth Amendment concerns. 
The Tenth Circuit’s disgorgement approach would force a sentencing court
to conduct a thorough analysis to determine the value of the stock a reasonable
point in time after the material non-public information was disclosed to the
public and base the defendant’s punishment on the harm that was proximately
caused by the offense.  While more complex, disgorgement is a more accurate
and fair standard for determining a defendant’s term of imprisonment based
on individual culpability.
3. Punishment Should Adequately Deter Criminal Conduct
It might be argued that the Mooney majority’s net-profit approach to
calculating gain for sentencing inside traders provides more deterrence than a
disgorgement theory.  The hypothetical above, where the insider purchased the
stock for $5 based on material non-public information and later sold for $20,
illustrates how the Mooney court’s approach would deter one from committing
the offense of insider trading based on the fear that one would be held
accountable, and imprisoned, based on factors completely unrelated to the
offense committed.  The possibility of serving exponentially more prison time
under a net-profit calculation may be the ultimate deterrent for insiders
considering the offense. 
Nevertheless, deterrence is not the only goal in criminal punishment, and
deterrence alone is not universally accepted as a sufficient justification for
punishment.  Under Retributivitist theories, punishment should be just and
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202. See United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1106-07 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Bright,
J., dissenting).
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Capital, LLC, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2005); see also SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142
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F. Supp.2d 418 (D.Md. 2005); S.E.C. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 503, 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); S.E.C. v. Michel 521 F. Supp.2d 795, 830-831 (N.D. Ill. E. Div. 2007).
204. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d at 1191.
205. See generally United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 2009).
206. See id. at 1084-85; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2) (West 2003).
should correlate to the defendant’s culpability.201  The high deterrent value of
using a net-profit approach is not enough to override inherent justifications for
punishing inside traders no more and no less than deserved based on their
individual culpability and the harm caused by their deception.  Furthermore,
a net-profit calculation has the potential to produce a lower sentence for an
inside trader than what may be warranted based on the inside trader’s actual
conduct.202
The primary purpose of disgorgement as a civil remedy for violating
security laws is to deprive violators of ill-gotten gains.203  In addition to
depriving wrongdoers of unjust enrichment, disgorgement is also intended “to
deter others from violating securities law by making violations
unprofitable.”204  Admittedly, both net-profit and disgorgement theories for
calculating gain have deterrent value; however, the Nacchio court’s
disgorgement approach is a more accurate and fair standard for punishing the
complex crime of inside trading.  It attempts to correlate the defendant’s
sentence with the actual profit received based on the defendant’s culpable
conduct, exclusive of other market factors.205  While adopting a net-profit
approach might serve as more of a deterrent, this must be weighed against the
fairness to the defendant in serving an extraordinary (and perhaps unjustified)
sentence.
The Tenth Circuit correctly determined that the policies of federal
sentencing—punishment, deterrence, individualize sentencing, and avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities—would be better suited by using
disgorgement as a guideline for calculating gain.206
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Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
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C. Calculating Gain Is No Exact Science
Congress did not specify a formula for calculating the “gain resulting from
the offense” in Section 2B1.4 of the U.S.S.G..  The Background to Section
2B1.4 merely states that “[b]ecause the victims and their losses are difficult if
not impossible to identify, the gain, i.e., the total increase in value realized
through trading in securities by the defendant . . . is employed instead of the
victims’ losses.”207
In order to calculate the gain under the Nacchio Court’s new standard, trial
courts must conduct an in-depth economic analysis to determine the point at
which the stock price absorbed the material inside information.208
Nevertheless, district courts are not left without guidance.  In SEC v.
MacDonald, the First Circuit set forth a formula for the district court to use to
when calculating a disgorgement figure.209  The MacDonald court recognized
that the reasonable period for dissemination and digestion of the inside
information will naturally vary depending on the significance of the
information disclosed.210  Furthermore, the Nacchio court gave lower courts
some guidance for determining an inside trader’s gain explaining that “[i]n
civil insider trading cases, the proper amount of disgorgement is generally the
difference between the value of the shares when the insider sold them while
in possession of the material, non-public information, and their market value
‘a reasonable time after public dissemination of the inside information.’”211 
Thus, lower courts within the Tenth Circuit must weigh the facts of each
case to determine the date where the market has absorbed the disclosure of
inside information in order to mark the point at which an inside trader’s gain
should be measured.  The Tenth Circuit explained that while the district
court’s analysis should be grounded in sound economic theory, it did not have
to be exact science;212 therefore, district courts will have discretion in
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stock price decline).
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(8th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Wang & Steinberg, supra note 1, § 7:2.2, at *7-25; see also
Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 6, at 5. 
218. See generally Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 6 (discussing relevant cases and using
experts regarding loss and gain calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines); see also Shapiro
& Seltzer, supra note 64, at 198-99.
219. See Shapiro & Seltzer, supra note 64, at 194 (listing external market factors affecting
determining the point to use as the benchmark for determining gain.213  Also,
to aid in their determinations following Nacchio, district courts have many
examples of disgorgement being applied in civil jurisprudence to guide their
analysis.214  These examples, combined with the discretion afforded district
courts for calculating gain, will ensure that the U.S. Constitutional and
Congressional goals of criminal punishment are met when sentencing inside
traders within the Tenth Circuit.
D. Nacchio’s Effect on the Future of Insider Trading Sentencing
Nacchio continues a trend (originating with the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Olis215) of adopting a civil standard as a backdrop for determining criminal
responsibility in securities cases on the basis that the civil standard is more
attuned to the complexities of the stock market.216  Federal circuit courts
currently differ on the proper way to calculate this gain.217  As a result of
Nacchio, district courts within the Tenth Circuit must now conduct a thorough
analysis in economic principles when determining gain for sentencing inside
traders.  It is probable that both criminal defendants and government
prosecutors will employ economic experts to analyze both the stock market and
individual securities in order to determine which point to use as the benchmark
for the gain calculation.218  An expert’s market study should exclude factors
unrelated to the defendant’s deception219 in an attempt to isolate the amount of
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that gain should only be attributed to the value realized from the insider’s conduct, not unrelated
market factors); see also Shapiro & Seltzer, supra note 64, at 198-99.
gain, if any, that can be attributed to the material non-public information’s
impact on the market, thereby ensuring that “the amount of gain calculated by
the court [will not overstate] the seriousness of the offense.”220
Insider trading has been characterized as “a sophisticated fraud.”221  It is
therefore reasonable to accept the need for a sophisticated method to calculate
an inside trader’s gain from deception.  As the Tenth Circuit correctly
concluded, determining the insider’s gain using a thorough economic analysis
specific to the facts of each case furthers federal sentencing objectives of
punishing inside traders for the ill-gotten gain proximately received as a result
of their deception, individualized sentencing, and ensuring just punishment for
the offense.
VI. Conclusion
“Congress’s goals of greater sentencing uniformity based on real conduct
and avoidance of unwarranted disparities . . . can be achieved only by
recognizing the importance of the causal relationship between conduct and
sentence.”222  Unlike a net-profit calculation, disgorgement may not be an
exact science and does not provide a bright line rule for sentencing courts to
follow; however, extensive fact-finding and economic analysis should be
employed to a greater degree in criminal sentencing when determining a prison
sentence that will take months or years out of a defendant’s life.223  The Tenth
Circuit’s sophisticated standard for calculating gain is not only a fair standard
for punishing a sophisticated fraud, it is also consistent with the foundations
of criminal justice and United States policy on criminal sentencing.  The
Nacchio disgorgement standard adopted by the Tenth Circuit meets
congressional goals of formulating a sentence not greater than necessary to
provide both: just punishment for defendants convicted of inside trading; and
adequate deterrence for others.
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